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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Suffering from a mental health emergency, Joseph Blake Scovill, who had a long history
of mental illness, was taken to the emergency room (ER) at Eastern Idaho Regional Medical
Center (EIRMC) by his father, late one night in the early autumn of 2017. Mr. Scovill's erratic
behavior continued while he was at EIRMC, and he was confronted by two off-duty police
officers who were working as security guards for the hospital. Eventually, one of the security
guards, Sage Albright, took Mr. Scovill to the ground and, with the help of the second guard,
subdued Mr. Scovill. The State charged Mr. Scovill with battery on a hospital worker, naming
Mr. Albright 1 as the victim.
Prior to trial, the State moved to preclude Mr. Scovill from presenting any evidence that
he was suffering from mental illness on the night in questions, arguing that evidence of
Mr. Scovill's mental condition was not relevant because battery is a general intent crime. The
district court agreed, and the court precluded Mr. Scovill from presenting evidence about his
mental condition at the time he allegedly battered Mr. Albright.
During the preliminary hearing, Mr. Albright testified that he took Mr. Scovill to the
ground before Mr. Scovill could attack him. Prior to trial, Mr. Albright told the prosecutor a
different version of events: that Mr. Scovill made contact with his chest, prior to Mr. Albright
taking him to the ground.
Mr. Scovill's counsel.

The prosecutor did not reveal this new version of events to

At trial, Mr. Scovill asked the district court to strike the portion of

Mr. Albright's testimony where he gave this new version of events as a sanction for the State's

1

Because Sage Albright was acting in his capacity as a security guard and not a police officer at
the time of the incident, he will be referred to as Mr. Albright in this brief.

failure to disclose this information to the defense. Ultimately, the district court implicitly found
the State's failure to disclose Mr. Albright's new version of events was a discovery violation, but
the court declined to strike his testimony because security camera footage of the incident was
played for the jury. A jury convicted Mr. Scovill of battery on a health care worker.
Mr. Scovill asserts the district court erred in two rulings. First, Mr. Scovill asserts the
district court abused its discretion by precluding him from presenting evidence of his mental
condition at the time of the incident, as such evidence was relevant to an element of the crime
charged, and thus was an issue of consequence the jury was required to determine. Second,
Mr. Scovill asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it declined to strike
Mr. Albright's new version of events - which was both diametrically opposed to what he
testified to during the preliminary hearing and known to the prosecutor - as a sanction for the
State's discovery violation. Mr. Scovill further asserts that the State will be unable to prove the
errors are individually harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, but even if the State meets that
standard, Mr. Scovill asserts the accumulation of these errors deprived him of his right to a fair
trial.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The State filed a criminal complaint alleging that Mr. Scovill committed a battery against
Sage Albright, an off duty police detective moonlighting as a security guard at EIRMC, at the
time of the incident. (R., pp.20-21; Tr. Prelim, p.5, L.9 - p.6, L.9.)

Preliminary Hearing
Mr. Albright testified during the preliminary hearing that the incident began when he and
his partner, Garren Kelly, another off duty officer employed as a security guard, were called to
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the waiting room outside of the ER. (Tr. Prelim, p.6, L. 10 - p. 7, L. 15; p.25, L.19 - p.28, L. 1.)
Mr. Scovill was "acting irrationally," "pacing around, trying to hand out the prescription
business cards," and when the guards confronted him, Mr. Scovill took off his jacket and acted
like he was getting ready to fight. (Tr. Prelim, p.7, Ls.16-22.) Mr. Scovill stated he did not want
to go into the ER, and when Mr. Albright suggested they would not force him to do so,
Mr. Scovill stated, "'Well, if you're not going to force me, then I'm leaving,"' and he walked
outside. (Tr. Prelim, p.7, L.23 - p.8, L.5.)
Mr. Albright and Mr. Kelly followed Mr. Scovill outside where he continued to act
irrationally, yelling profanities and again posturing like he wanted to fight. (Tr. Prelim, p.8, L.17
- p.9, L.19.) After they told Mr. Scovill that they did not want to fight him but wanted him to go
back into the hospital to get some help, Mr. Scovill started running towards the ER. (Tr. Prelim,
p.9, Ls.17-22.) Mr. Albright testified that he followed Mr. Scovill back into the ER waiting
room where Mr. Scovill "turned and spun to confront me; and I believe he raised his left arm like
he was going to throw a punch." (Tr. Prelim, p.9, L.23 - p.10, L.8.) Mr. Albright continued,
"when [Mr. Scovill] raised his arm and stepped towards me, I wrapped him up around the torso
and the head with my arms and my upper body and took him to the ground." (Tr. Prelim, p. l 0,
Ls.9-12.) When asked if Mr. Scovill was "trying to hit" him, Mr. Albright testified "it felt like
over and over again he was trying to hit me. He was grabbing onto my vest and holding me
tight, trying to hold me to the ground and control me."

(Tr. Prelim, p.10, Ls.13-17.)

Mr. Albright testified that he punched Mr. Scovill in the face "a few times with a closed fist,
trying to get him to comply with my lawful orders." (Tr. Prelim, p.11, Ls.17-20.)
Mr. Albright made it clear during cross-examination that he attacked Mr. Scovill before
Mr. Scovill could attack him: "I don't have to wait to be punched before I can take use force - or
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use use of force." (Tr. Prelim, p.19, L.23 - p.20, L.l.) Mr. Albright further testified that the
reason he tackled Mr. Scovill was because of "[h]is body language, the fact that he had
challenged me to fight over and over again, he obviously was articulating that he wanted to hurt
me in some way." (Tr. Prelim, p.20, Ls.5-15.)
Although he did not have any recollection of Mr. Scovill punching him, after Mr. Scovill
was detained, Mr. Albright noticed he had an abrasion on his jawline and "some light bleeding."
(Tr. Prelim, p.13, Ls.1-5.)

In light of his scratched jawline, Mr. Albright speculated that

Mr. Scovill must have struck him at some point after he took Mr. Scovill to the ground, while
Mr. Albright was on top of him. (Tr. Prelim, p.22, L.23 - p.24, L.3.)
For the most part, Mr. Kelly's recollection of the incident matched Mr. Albright's
testimony, and Mr. Kelly testified that he assisted Mr. Albright by grabbing Mr. Scovill's legs in
order to control and handcuff him, after Mr. Albright took Mr. Scovill to the ground.
(Tr. Prelim, p.25, L.19 - p.38, L.7.) However, Mr. Kelly could not see Mr. Scovill "square up"
with Mr. Albright from his vantage prior, but he did see Mr. Albright take Mr. Scovill to the
ground and punch him in the face.

(Tr. Prelim, p.36, L.8 - p.37, L.24.)

When asked if

Mr. Scovill attacked either he or Mr. Albright prior to Mr. Albright tackling him, Mr. Kelly
testified, "No. Like I said, we followed him around the parking lot. That one moment he did
square off with us again as if he was going to fight. Then he started walking away towards the
medical building. Then he took off running toward the ER." (Tr. Prelim, p.37, L.25 - p.38,

L.6.)
The State then played excerpts from a 17-minute video recording taken from a
surveillance camera inside the ER waiting room for the magistrate. (Tr. Prelim, p.38, L.14 p.42, L.9.)
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Mr. Scovill's father, Van Scovill, testified that he saw his son earlier that night and he
was very upset, anxious, incoherent, and couldn't carry on a thoughtful conversation.
(Tr. Prelim, p.45, L.4 - p.49, L.3.) Van Scovill testified that his son has had mental health
problems since he was four years-old and that his current diagnoses include bipolar disorder,
mania, and ADHD, according to his psychiatrist. (Tr. Prelim, p.49, L.22 - p.51, L.2.) Van
Scovill testified that he took his son to the ER because he believed he was having an adverse
reaction to his medications. (Tr. Prelim, p.52, Ls.3-18.)
The magistrate found probable cause and bound Mr. Scovill over into the district court.
(Tr. Prelim, p.68, L.21 - p.71, L.10; R., p.64.)

Pre-Trial
Prior to trial, the State filed a motion asking the district court "to prohibit the Defendant
from presenting any evidence regarding mental illness, diagnosis, or condition at trial in this
matter." (R., pp.122-24.) The State argued that mental illness is not a defense to a criminal
charge in Idaho, and expert evidence can only be presented on the defendant' s state of mind
when he is charged with a specific intent crime; therefore, Mr. Scovill should be precluded from
presenting any evidence of his mental condition because battery is a general intent crime. (Id.)
The State argued Mr. Scovill's "state of mind is NOT an element of the offense," so "his mental
condition or diagnosis is not relevant to any evidence to be proved at trial . .." (R., p.123
(emphasis in original).)
During a hearing on the State's motion, the State noted that Mr. Scovill had turned over
medical and mental health records, but they have not disclosed any intent to call any of his
treatment providers as expert witnesses. (Tr. 3/28/18, p.6, L.7 - p.7, L.13.) The State then
repeated its argument that Mr. Scovill's mental health is not relevant because his mental

5

condition is not an element of battery, because battery is a general intent crime. (Tr. 3/28/18,
p.7, L.14 - p.9, L.18.) The State further asserted that evidence of Mr. Scovill's mental condition
would "lead the jury astray of what they are supposed to be looking at" and is therefore overly
prejudicial, even if it was relevant. (Tr. 3/28/18, p.9, L.19 - p.10, L.18.)
In response, Mr. Scovill's counsel argued that information about his mental illness on the
night in question was "background." (Tr. 3/28/18, p.10, L.20 - p.11, L.13.) "I think's it's
embarrassing if we decide to say, Oh, jury, sorry. You don't get any background about what
happened, how this person got to the hospital or why he got to the hospital or why he was at the
hospital. That's not fair to the jury. That's making a mockery of the system." (Tr. 3/28/ 18,
p.11, Ls.8-13.) Counsel argued the jury is entitled to background as to what happened in the
case and that he should be able to put on evidence that Mr. Scovill "was in psychosis, that he had
a long history of mental illness, that this wasn't just something that just all of a sudden popped
up." (Tr. 3/28/18, p.12, Ls.2-18.) Defense counsel had not determined whether he would
attempt to call an expert witness, "[b]ut at the end of the day his background is absolutely
relevant and absolutely material." (Tr. 3/28/18, p.12, L.19 - p.13, L.2.) Counsel for Mr. Scovill
further argued that he intended to raise an "unconscious act" defense, "[a]nd so our defense is
that he was in such a psychotic state that he doesn't know what he was doing." (Tr. 3/28/18,
p.17, Ls.2-9.)
The district court found, "It's pretty clear, this is a general intent crime. When you look
at the definition of a battery, it talks about a willful act. And it's not necessarily an act intending
to harm somebody or even make contact. It's just a willful act." (Tr. 3/28/18, p.18, Ls.16-20.)
The court further found that "[m]ental illness is not a defense to a willful act" and, therefore,
evidence of Mr. Scovill's mental health issues are not relevant, "unless we're talking about
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something that he does completely involuntary." (Tr. 3/28/18, p.19, Ls.2-16.) The court held
that Mr. Scovill could present some background information as to what brought him to the
hospital, but his mental health issues are not relevant. (Tr. 3/28/18, p.19, L.17 - p.20, L.16.) At
Mr. Scovill's counsel's request, the district court agreed to review the transcript of the
preliminary hearing in order to provide the parties with guidance as to what information could be
presented to the jury. (Tr. 3/28/18, p.20, L.17 - p.24, L.5.)
After reviewing the preliminary hearing transcripts and the security video taken of the
incident, the district court entered a written order. (R., pp.134-37.) The court provided the
definition of battery and found that, "in order to be admissible, mental health records or evidence
of mental condition must be probative of 'willfullness' and/or 'intent' as to the proscribed act."
(R., pp.134-36.) The court recognized that there is evidence that Mr. Scovill suffers from bipolar disorder and other mental health conditions, but found the following:
Based on the record, this Court cannot see how Defendant's medical
history is relevant to the issue of whether Defendant's actions were willful and/or
his alleged physical contact with the security officer was voluntary and "on
purpose." Indeed, it appears from the testimony at the time of the preliminary
hearing that Defendant was consciously prepared for a physical altercation with
the security officer.
At the time of trial, it will likely be obvious to the jurors through the
testimony of the security officers that Defendant was having mental health issues
at the time of the incident. Defendant's agitated and somewhat irrational state is
simply an underlying fact of the alleged battery. However, testimony from the
father as to why he transported his son to the emergency room is not probative of
any issue before the jury. To what degree evidence of Defendant's mental state is
allowed to be presented to the jury will largely depend on the State's case and
evidence presented of the alleged crime.
In conclusion, the Court rules at this time as follows:
1.
Medical records or medical history of the Defendant are not
relevant and will not be admitted.
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2.
Testimony from the father or anyone else as to the circumstances
by which Defendant was transported to the emergency room is not relevant and
will not be admitted.

It is possible for this ruling to be modified based upon the evidence
presented by the State.
(R., pp.136-37.)

The State's first witness at trial was Kara Barnes, a Certified Nursing Assistant, who was
working at the receptionist desk on the night of the incident. (Tr. 4/24/18, p. l 02, L.4 - p. l 03,
L.21.) Ms. Barnes testified that just after midnight, Mr. Scovill aggressively walked into the
waiting room, flipped her off, and began "tossing things around." (Tr. 4/24/18, p. l 06, L.11 p. l 07, L. 13.) Ms. Barnes asked Mr. Scovill if she could help him, and he responded by saying
"something to the effect of, 'Go back to pretending like you're working and mind your own
business."' (Tr. 4/24/18, p.108, Ls.12-17.} Mr. Scovill' s father then came into the ER and spoke
with Ms. Barnes, while Mr. Scovill continued to "kind of toss things," so she motioned to her coworker to call security.

(Tr. 4/24/18, p.108, L.22 - p.109, L.24.)

Ms. Barnes testified

Mr. Scovill took off his jacket, popped his neck, and said, "let's go" when the security guards
arrived. (Tr. 4/24/18, p.109, L.25 - p.110, L.21.) After that, the security guards followed
Mr. Scovill outside. (Tr. 4/24/18, p.110, L.22 - p.111, L.4.)
Ms. Barnes saw Mr. Scovill come back into the ER waiting room a few minutes later
followed closely by Mr. Albright, and she saw Mr. Scovill lunge towards Mr. Albright.
(Tr. 4/24/18, p.111, L.5 - p.112, L.l.)

The prosecutor then asked Ms. Barnes if she saw

Mr. Scovill make contact with Mr. Albright, and she responded, "[h]e did make contact," and
Mr. Albright then pushed Mr. Scovill back.
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(Tr. 4/24/18, p.112, Ls.2-13.)

On cross-

examination, Ms. Barnes was asked if she had ever met with the prosecutor prior to testifying,
and she stated that she had met with the prosecutor on two occasions prior to testifying.
(Tr. 4/24/18, p.115, L.11 - p.116, L.22.)
Outside the presence of the jury, counsel for Mr. Scovill moved to strike Ms. Barnes'
testimony as a sanction for the prosecutor's failure to disclose to the defense the statements
Ms. Barnes made to the prosecutor, in violation of Idaho Criminal Rule 16. (Tr. 4/24/18, p.117,
Ls.5-23.) The prosecutor admitted that she did not provide any information about Ms. Barnes'
statements, and instead merely provided her name and contact information. (Tr. 4/24/18, p.117,
L.24 - p.118, L.14.) The district court agreed that the State's failure to disclose Mr. Barnes'
statements was a discovery violation and the court ordered the jury to disregard her testimony
"about what she saw with regard to any contact between the defendant and Mr. Albright," as a
sanction. (Tr. 4/24/18, p.118, L.17 - p.123, L.8.)
The State next called Emily Zundel, a nurse who was present during the incident, but
Ms. Zundel's substantive testimony was limited to verifying that she had watched the security
camera footage of the incident the jurors would later see themselves through Exhibit 1.
(Tr. 4/24/18, p.124, L.3 - p.125, L.14.) Next, Garren Kelly testified consistently, for the most
part, with his preliminary hearing testimony. (Tr. 4/24/ 18, p.126, L.7 - p.158, L.25.) Mr. Kelly
acknowledged that he did not actually see Mr. Albright tackle Mr. Scovill, as he had testified
during the preliminary hearing, but instead surmised that is what occurred since he saw
Mr. Albright lunge toward Mr. Scovill, and then next saw Mr. Albright on top of Mr. Scovill on
the floor. (Tr. 4/24/18, p.156, L.18 - p.157, L.8.)
Prior to the State offering Mr. Albright's testimony, and outside the presence of the jury,
counsel for Mr. Scovill asked him if he had met with the prosecutor since the preliminary
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hearing, and Mr. Albright acknowledged that he had two such meetings with the prosecutor,
where he watched the security camera footage and discussed his testimony. (Tr. 4/24/18, p.159,
L.12 - p.162, L.7) In light of this disclosure, Mr. Scovill's counsel asked the court to preclude
Mr. Albright from testifying. (Tr. 4/24/18, p.162, Ls.8-18.)
The district court then had the flowing exchange with Mr. Albright:
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Albright, let me ask a question. Any - in your
discussion with any representative of the State, did that result in any memories or
recollections different than what you testified to in your preliminary hearing?
[MR. ALBRIGHT]: Can I answer conversationally?
THE COURT: Sure. Yes.
[MR. ALBRIGHT]: Okay. I would have to say yes. But the - the video has been
posted on the Internet for - since our preliminary hearing, and I viewed the video
multiple times since the preliminary hearing, and the majority of my recollection
becoming clear has been the result of watching that video as it was posted on the
Internet. And that memory becoming clearer has been, I guess, strengthened in
my conversations with the prosecutor. 2
(Tr. 4/24/18, p.162, L.19 - p.163, L.7 (emphasis added).) The State then acknowledged that it
did not provide Mr. Scovill with any information about Mr. Albright's new description of the
events he gave to the prosecutor, but claimed the discovery rules did not require the State to
make such disclosures. (Tr. 4/24/ 18, p.163, L.8 - p.164, L.4.)
Despite Mr. Albright's admission that the testimony he planned to offer to the jury would
differ from what he testified to during the preliminary hearing, the court found "I don't see
anything here that shows that there would be a change in testimony from Mr. Albright from what
the video would show or what he had previously testified to." (Tr. 4/24/18, p.165, Ls.1-21.)

2

Mr. Albright's claim that his recollection of the incident became clear after reviewing the video
once it was posted on the internet is perhaps questionable, considering that he testified during the
preliminary hearing that he had reviewed the video prior to providing that testimony.
(Tr. Prelim, p.15, L.22 - p.16, L.8.)
10

After defense counsel made a record by reading aloud Idaho Criminal Rule 16(b)(6), and noting
when Mr. Scovill filed his discovery request, the court explicitly stated that it was "not finding a
discovery violation or a basis to strike the testimony, so at this point we'll go forward. "
(Tr. 4/24/18, p.166, L.l - p.167, L.2.) When the prosecutor asked the court about whether there
were any limits on Mr. Albright's testimony, the court responded as follows:
Right. I mean, I don't - I haven't got a precise memory of his testimony in the
preliminary hearing, but I understand it' s possible that what he said in the
preliminary hearing doesn't exactly jibe with what's shown on the video. So he
can certainly say, "Yeah, I thought this earlier; but looking at the video, this is
what happened." I think he's free to say that. If he's saying something different,
if he's saying something that happened outside of the video that is different from
the preliminary hearing, to me that is a problem.
(Tr. 4/24/18, p.167, Ls.3-19.)
Mr. Albright then testified in front of the jury explaining his background as a police
officer and part-time security guard for EIRMC, and that he and Mr. Kelly responded to a
security alert occurring in the waiting room of the ER on the night of the incident. (Tr. 4/24/18,
p.168, L.15 - p.174, L.24.) As he had during the preliminary hearing, Mr. Albright described
Mr. Scovill' s behavior in the ER, Mr. Scovill taking off his jacket and posturing like he wanted
to fight believing the two guards were going to force him to go into the ER, and Mr. Scovill
walking outside when Mr. Albright and Mr. Kelly told him they would not force him into the
ER. (Tr. 4/24/1 8, p.174, L.25 - p.177, L.16.) Mr. Albright testified that he and Mr. Kelly
followed Mr. Scovill outside and as he walked around the EIRMC campus, and that at one point,
Mr. Scovill again took off his jacket and postured like he wanted to fight. (Tr. 4/24/18, p.177,
L.17 - p.179, L.21.) Mr. Albright remembered "a lot of flailing arms, saying things like, 'Fuck
off. Fuck you. • At one point he told me that I should call him Spartacus. He was just acting kind
of uncontrollable." (Tr. 4/24/ 18, p.179, Ls.2-7.)
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Mr. Albright testified that when he and Mr. Kelly tried to coax Mr. Scovill to go back
into the ER, Mr. Scovill picked up his jacket and started walking towards the ER, and then
started sprinting. (Tr. 4/24/18, p. I 79, L.16 - p.180, L.2.) Mr. Albright ran after Mr. Scovill,
following him back into the ER's waiting room.

(Tr. 4/24/18, p.180, L.3 - p.181, L.4.)

Mr. Albright testified that he "saw Mr. Scovill spinning to his left. He had what appeared to me
as his arm cocked back, his left hand - or, yeah, left hand in a fist, and he spun towards me like
he was going to try and punch me." (Tr. 4/24/18, p.1881, Ls.5-9.)
At this point, Mr. Albright's testimony diverged from his preliminary hearing testimony:
"I was still moving forward. Mr. Scovill came and hit me in the chest with his upper torso. I
wrapped him up." (Tr. 4/24/18, p.181, Ls.10-12 (emphasis added).)
Mr. Albright testified that he took Mr. Scovill to the ground, Mr. Scovill tried to hit him
while Mr. Albright was on top of Mr. Scovill, and Mr. Albright punched Mr. Scovill in the face
three times with a closed fist. (Tr. 4/24/18, p.181, L.13 - p.183, L.17.) With Mr. Kelly's
assistance, Mr. Albright was eventually able to get control of Mr. Scovill, and they placed him in
handcuffs. (Tr. 4/24/18, p.183, L.18 - p.184, L.6.) Mr. Albright told the jury about his cheek
abrasion and opined that Mr. Scovill was the source, although he stated, "I don't know how he
did it." (Tr. 4/24/18, p.184, L. I 5 - p.185, L.2.)
The State then played the surveillance video of the incident for the jury. (Tr. 4/24/18,
p.186, L.4 - p.188, L.20.) The 17 minute, 26 second video is taken from a stationary camera
pointing towards the entry of the ER waiting room, with the receptionist desk in view. (Ex. 1.)
The first half of the video generally supports the testimony provided by the State's witnesses,
showing Mr. Scovill enter the ER waiting room in what appears to be an agitated state,
Mr. Albright and Mr. Kelly confronting Mr. Scovill, Mr. Scovill taking off his jacket acting as if
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he wanted to fight, and Mr. Scovill leaving the ER waiting room and the guards following him
out.

(Ex. I: 00:45-03:45.)3 A little over nine minutes into the video, Mr. Scovill is seen

reentering the ER waiting room, followed closely by Mr. Albright; Ms. Scovill turns sideways
and takes a half step towards Mr. Albright; Mr. Albright then wraps Mr. Scovill up around the
head and neck area and takes him to the ground; Mr. Kelly arrives and they are eventually able to
subdue Mr. Scovill, put him on a gurney, and take him into the ER. (Ex.I: 09:13-12:56.)4
The video simply does not show whether or not Mr. Albright wrapped up Mr. Scovill's
head, neck, and shoulder area prior to Mr. Scovill making any contact with him, as Mr. Albright
testified during the preliminary hearing (Tr. Prelim, p.19, L.23 - p.20, L. 1), or whether
Mr. Scovill made contact with Mr. Albright's chest area before Mr. Albright wrapped up
Mr. Scovill, as Mr. Albright testified at trial (Tr. 4/24/18, p.181, Ls.10-12). The State then
presented Exhibit 2, a still photo taken from the video of the moment Mr. Albright claimed
Mr. Scovill made contact with him. (Tr. 4/24/18, p.189, L.11 - p.190, L.20; Ex. 2.) The photo
clearly depicts Mr. Albright's arms on Mr. Scovill's head, neck, and shoulder area, but it does
not clearly depict whether or not Mr. Scovill made contact with Mr. Albright. (Ex. 2.)
Mr. Scovill's counsel asked Mr. Albright about what he meant when he testified during
the preliminary hearing that Mr. Scovill was acting irrationally, and whether he believed that
Mr. Scovill was in need of some treatment. (Tr. 4/24/ 18, p.192, L.8 - p.193, L.9.) Outside the
presence of the jury, the prosecutor asked the court to preclude Mr. Scovill's counsel from
presenting any further evidence of Mr. Scovill's mental health at the time of the incident.

3

Times are approximate.
Due to a half-wall that is in the camera's view, the video does not show Mr. Albright punching
Mr. Scovill, but it does show Mr. Albright on top of Mr. Scovill, and Mr. Kelly assist him in
subduing Mr. Scovill by grabbing his legs. (Ex. I: 09: 13-12:56.)
4
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(Tr. 4/24/18, p.193, L. I 5 - p. I 94, L.6.) The court agreed, stating "I'm going to hold to my prior
order. To the extent we're talking about a mental health history and mental health issues even at
the time of the occurrence, I didn't see how that was relevant. That's still my opinion. I mean, at
some point we cross the line." (Tr. 4/24/18, p.194, Ls.18-24.) The court ruled that defense
counsel could ask Mr. Albright what he was thinking, but he would not allow him to speculate
that Mr. Scovill was suffering from mental illness. (Tr. 4/24/1 8, p.194, L.24 - p.196, L.6.)
While still outside the presence of the jury, Mr. Scovill's attorney renewed his motion to
strike portions of Mr. Albright's testimony as a sanction for the State's discovery violation: "I'm
specifically referring to where he said that my client hit him in the chest, and that goes - that
exactly goes to the issue" (Tr. 4/24/18, p.196, L.17 - p.198, L. l .) The district court held,
Right. And that's the issue I would have concern with. The problem is, is
the video speaks for itself. The video trumps everything. I mean, regardless of
what this witness or any other witness says about how they perceived the incident,
the video speaks for itself. And so that - I think you're probably right, that's a
change in testimony; but I don't think it's material because we do have the video
to show exactly what happened regardless of what this or any other witness says.
Technically I think you're correct, Mr. Thomas. From a substantial substantive standpoint I don't think it makes any difference. It's certainly not
prejudicial enough to where I feel like I need to strike that at this point. Frankly,
it calls more attention to the statement anyway. So I'm not going to disallow it. I
guess if I was doing what I did earlier, a limiting instruction; but I don't think that
is going to cure anything. Even though the testimony's changed a bit, it's still not
going to affect how the jury views the video. That's just how I see that.
(Tr. 4/24/18, p.198, Ls.2-20.) Defense counsel further noted that Mr. Albright testified that
Mr. Scovill said "Call me Spartacus," and he wanted to be able to ask Mr. Albright about that
statement; the court ruled that defense counsel could ask Mr. Albright about that statement, but
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that "I'd like to think that my position on not delving into the mental health condition is clear at
this point."5 (Tr. 4/24/18, p.198, L.21 - p.203, L.11.)
Once the jury returned, Mr. Scovill's counsel cross-examined Mr. Albright about the fact
that his testimony to the jury differs from the testimony he gave during the preliminary hearing,
noting that he previously did not claim that Mr. Scovill made contact with his chest before he
took him to the ground. (Tr. 4/24/18, p.203, L.21 - p.205, L.7.) Mr. Albright explained his
change in testimony as follows:
I'm saying that after, you know, reviewing the video multiple times,
because it has been published online, that has given me a clearer understanding of
what happened, a clearer recollection, that to me it's obvious that Mr. Scovill hit
me in the chest as I was wrapping up and then we went to the ground.
(Tr. 4/24/18, p.205, Ls.6-12.) Mr. Albright continued, "reviewing the video helps me to recollect

it better," and he believed his recollection was better at trial than it was when he testified during
the preliminary hearing. (Tr. 4/24/18, p.205, Ls.13-20.)
The next day,6 defense counsel continued his cross examination during which
Mr. Albright admitted that in the investigating officer's report, a written document he provided

s When Mr. Scovill's counsel asked Mr. Albright about the "call me Spartacus" comment,
Mr. Albright testified that it could have meant a number of things such as Mr. Scovill not
wanting him to know his name, and Mr. Albright thought Mr. Scovill might be on
methamphetamine, even though there was no indication that Mr. Scovill was actually on
methamphetamine. (Tr. 4/24/ 18, p.206, L.15 - p.207, L.8.) The parties later stipulated, and the
jury was instructed, that Mr. Scovill was not under the influence of methamphetamine.
(Tr. 4/24/18, p.223, L. l - p.226, L.2; Tr. 4/25/18, p.229, Ls.5-11; J.I. 15.)
6
At the conclusion of the previous day, outside the presence of the jury, Mr. Scovill's counsel
again asked the court to sanction the State for failing to disclose Mr. Albright's testimony that he
feared Mr. Scovill would grab one of his own weapons while he was on top of Mr. Scovill,
punching him in the face. (Tr. 4/24/18, p.217, L.4 - p.219, L.9.) The court recognized that this
was indeed a problem, but believed that it could be cured if the State argued that the charged
battery occurred only when Mr. Scovill allegedly bumped into Mr. Albright while the two were
standing, instead of occurring while the two were on the floor, and the State agreed to argue only
this theory to the jury. (Tr. 4/24/18, p.219, L.10 - p.222, L.12.)
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to the investigating officer, and throughout his preliminary hearing testimony, he never claimed
that Mr. Scovill made contact with him before he took Mr. Scovill to the ground. (Tr. 4/25/18,
p.229, L.16 - p.233, L.10.) Mr. Albright admitted that it was "accurate" to say that he lunged
towards Mr. Scovill, while Mr. Scovill lunged towards him, but claims this accurate description
is "misrepresenting what the video shows." (Tr. 4/25/18, p.238, L.23 - p.239, L.19.) On redirect, the prosecutor asked Mr. Albright about him following Mr. Scovill back into the ER, and
there was a pause in the proceedings as Mr. Albright said that he was "frustrated," and he began
to cry; after Mr. Albright regained his composure, he agreed that he was moving towards
Mr. Scovill when the two first made physical contact. (Tr. 4/25/18, p.240, L.24 - p.243, L.3.)
Mr. Scovill called his father as a witness in his defense. (Tr. 4/25/18, p.247, Ls.9-24.)
Regarding the brief moment before Mr. Albright took his son to the floor, Van Scovill testified
that from his perspective, it looked like Mr. Scovill was simply trying to "skirt past"
Mr. Albright and leave the hospital again. (Tr. 4/25/18, p.250, L.12 - p.251, L.12.) Due to the
court's order, Van Scovill was precluded from testifying about why he took his son to the ER;
namely, that Mr. Scovill was suffering from a mental health emergency that night. (Compare
Tr. Prelim, p.45, L.24 - p.52, L.18, with Tr. 4/25/18, p.247, L.9 - p.256, L. l .)
Mr. Scovill testified on his own behalf. (Tr. 4/25/18, p.266, L.6.) He testified that he
remembered some things from that night, but not others.

(Tr. 4/25/18, p.267, Ls.15-17.)

Mr. Scovill did not remember walking into the ER, but he did remember flipping off the
receptionist, which is something he does not normally do, and he remembers handing out the
prescription cards. (Tr. 4/25/18, p.267, L.18-p.268, L.6.) He testified that he was "burning off
energy" and he remembered the security guards, but believed they were police officers, and he
was afraid of them and they caused him a lot of anxiety because they kept advancing towards
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him. (Tr. 4/25/18, p.268, L. I0 - p.269, L.13.) Mr. Scovill left the ER because he did not want to
fight them. (Tr. 4/25/18, p.269, Ls.15-19.) Mr. Scovill did not remember much about what
happened outside, but he went back inside the ER believing if he did not, they would take him to
jail. (Tr. 4/25/18, p.269, L.20 - p.272, L. 10.) Mr. Scovill did not remember what happened
prior to Mr. Albright taking him to the ground; he just remembers believing they were police
officers and he did not want to have any physical contact with them. (Tr. 4/25/18, p.273, L.16 p.275, L.18.) On cross-examination, Mr. Scovill testified that he believed the video of the
incident showed him turning so he could try to leave, and that he did not believe he pushed into
Mr. Albright. (Tr. 4/25/18, p.285, Ls.7-19.) Pursuant to the district court's order, Mr. Scovill
was not allowed to present any evidence of what his mental state actually was on the night of the
incident. (Tr. 4/25/18, p.266, L.6 - p.286, L. 13.)
The jury found Mr. Scovill guilty. (R., p.190.) The district court withheld judgment and
placed Mr. Scovill on probation. (R., pp.192-96.) Mr. Scovill filed a timely Notice of Appeal.
(R., pp.197-201.)
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ISSUES
).

Did the district court abuse its discretion by precluding Mr. Scovill from presenting
evidence of his mental state at the time of the alleged incident?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by failing to strike Mr. Albright's testimony that
Mr. Scovill made contact with him before he took Mr. Scovill to the ground, as a sanction
for the State's failure to disclose this assertion prior to trial?

In

Did the accumulation of errors, even if individually harmless, deprive Mr. Scovill of his
Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial?
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ARGUMENT

I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Precluding Mr. Scovill From Presenting Evidence
Of His Mental State At The Time Of The Alleged Incident

A.

Introduction
The district court found that evidence of Mr. Scovill's mental state at the time of the

incident was not relevant to the battery charge he faced. This ruling is in error. Evidence is
relevant if it has any tendency to make a fact of consequence more or less probable than it would
be without the evidence. Because the State was required to prove that Mr. Scovill acted with a
certain mental state in order to convict him of battery against a health care worker, evidence of
his mental state at the time of the alleged battery was relevant, and the district court abused its
discretion by acting outside the bounds of the applicable legal standards by ruling otherwise.

B.

Evidence Of Mr. Scovill's Mental State When He Committed The Allegedly Criminal
Act Was Relevant. And The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Precluding Him
From Presenting Such Evidence
The admissibility of evidence is a discretionary determination that will be disturbed on

appeal only where the district court abuses that discretion. State v. Godwin, 164 Idaho 903, 918
(2019) (citations omitted). In reviewing a district court's discretionary determination, appellate
Courts considers four factors:
Whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached
its decision by the exercise of reason.
Id. (quoting Lzmneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856,863 (2018)).

The district court held that evidence about Mr. Scovill's mental state at the time of the
incident was not relevant, and therefore not admissible, because LC. § 18-207 precludes a
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defendant from raising mental illness as an affirmative defense. (R., pp.134-38; Tr. 4/24/18,
p.194, Ls.18-24.) The court's narrow of view of relevance is inconsistent with the applicable
legal standards.
At the time of Mr. Scovill's trial, the Idaho Supreme Court defined "relevant evidence"
as "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence." I.R.E. 401 (2017). Mr. Scovill was charged with battery against a health care worker
under LC. § 18-915C which makes it a felony for any person to commit a battery against a
hospital employee, when that employee is engaged in the course of performing his or her duties.
Idaho Code § 18-903 defines "battery" as follows:
(a) Willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another; or
(b) Actual, intentional and unlawful touching or striking of another person against
the will of the other; or
(c) Unlawfully and intentionally causing bodily harm to an individual.

I.C. § 18-903 (emphasis added).
Therefore, in order for the jury find that Mr. Scovill committed a battery against a health
care worker, the State was required to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Mr. Scovill
committed a battery.

(See J.I. 22 Gury instruction defining "battery"); J.I. 24 (elements

instruction)7; see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).) In order to do that, the State was
required to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Mr. Scovill committed certain acts with a
certain mental state: That Mr. Scovill either willfully used force or violence against Mr. Albright,

intentionally touched or struck Mr. Albright, or intentionally caused bodily harm to Mr. Albright.
I.C. § 18-903; J.I. 22; J.I. 24. Thus, Mr. Scovill's mental state at the time of his alleged crime

7

Mr. Scovill has filed a motion to augment the record with a copy of the Jury Instructions given
by the district court. The motion to augment is pending.
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was certainly a "fact that is of consequence to the determination of' whether he committed a
battery against a health care worker.

Under the applicable legal standards, Mr. Scovill's

proffered evidence - that he was suffering from some sort of a mental health crisis at the time of
the incident - is relevant to the question of whether he had the requisite mental state to commit a
battery against Mr. Albright.
The district court's apparent conclusion that a defendant may not proffer evidence of his
mental condition when a defendant is charged with a general intent crime is incorrect. While it is
true that J.C. § 18-207( 1) bars mental condition as an affirmative defense to a charge of criminal
conduct, that statute does not bar a defendant from presenting evidence of his mental condition if
he is charged with a non-specific intent crime. "LC. § 18-207 reduces the question of mental
condition from the status of a formal defense to that of an evidentiary question." State v. Beam,
109 Idaho 6 I 6, 62 I ( I 985). The statute specifically allows a defendant to present "expert
evidence on the issue of any state of mind which is an element of the offense charged, subject to
the rules of evidence." LC. § 18-207(3) (emphasis added). Nothing in the plain language of
I.C. § 18-207 precludes a defendant from presenting evidence of his mental condition at the time
of the alleged crime, regardless of whether the crime charged requires the State to prove the
defendant had a specific intent, or a general intent, to commit the crime. 8
But even if evidence of a defendant's mental condition at the time of the alleged crime
were relevant only where the State charges a specific intent crime, the State in fact charged
Mr. Scovill with a specific intent crime, at least under two of the three alternatives upon which a
battery can be committed. While a defendant certainly can commit a battery with general intent

8

Notably, the district court's ruling would seemingly prevent a defendant from testifying that he
indeed had the mental state applicable to the crime charged, because admitting guilt is not an
affirmative defense.
21

- by willfully using force or violence - a defendant can also commit battery with specific intent
- either the intent to touch or strike, or the intent to cause bodily harm. The Court of Appeals
explained this distinction in State v. Billings, 137 Idaho 827 (2002):
As to subsection (a), the culpable state of mind is specified to be "willful."
The meaning of this word is illuminated by I.C. § 18-101(1), which states: "The
word 'wilfully,' when applied to the intent with which an act is done or omitted,
implies simply a purpose or willingness to commit the act ... referred to. It does
not require any intent to violate law, or to injure another, or to acquire any
advantage." (Emphasis added.) The "act referred to" in the definition of battery
under subsection (a) of§ 18-903 is the "use of force or violence upon the person
of another." Thus, proof of a violation of subsection (a) requires a showing that
the accused purposely used force or violence upon the victim's body. Although it
is not necessary that the defendant know that the act is illegal or intend that it
cause bodily injury, it is necessary that the defendant intend a forceful or violent
contact with the other person.
As to subsections (b) and (c), the requisite culpable state of mind is intent.
Idaho Code§ 18-114 instructs that "[i]n every crime or public offense there must
exist a union, or joint operation, of act and intent ...." This intent is "not an intent
to commit a crime, but is merely the intent to knowingly perform the interdicted
act ...." State v. Parish, 79 Idaho 75, 78, 310 P.2d 1082, 1083
(1957) (quoting State v. Taylor, 59 Idaho 724, 738, 87 P.2d 454, 460 (I 939)). See
also State v. Fox, 124 Idaho 924, 926, 866 P.2d 181, 183 (1993); State v. Nastoff,
124 Idaho 667, 670, 862 P.2d 1089, 1092 (Ct.App.1993). The "interdicted acts"
in the definitions of battery under§ 18-903(b) and (c) are, respectively, "touching
or striking of another person against the will of the other" and "causing bodily
harm to an individual." It follows that a conviction for violation of subsection (b)
requires proof of intent to touch or strike another person, and the intent element to
be proved under subsection (c) is intent to cause bodily harm to a person.

Id. at 830.
In neither its criminal complaint (R., pp.20-21 }, nor its information (R., pp.69-70), did the
State limit its battery allegation by citing only subsection (a) of the LC. § 18-903, or by including
any language that would indicate that only the general intent means of committing a battery was
charged.

Instead the State merely alleged that Mr. Scovill committed a battery against

Mr. Albright and that Mr. Albright was a health care worker. (R., pp.20-21, 69-70.) Thus, the
State alleged that Mr. Scovill, in fact, committed the battery with specific intent under two of the
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three alternatives ways in which a battery can be committed. Even under the State's misguided
theory, which the district court appears to have adopted, Mr. Scovill should not have been
precluded from presenting evidence of his mental condition to the jury.
The district court failed to apply the proper legal standards when determining that
evidence of Mr. Scovill's mental state at the time of the crime was not relevant and not
admissible, because such evidence is clearly relevant and admissible. See I.C. §§ 18-903; 1891 SC; I.R.E. 401. As such, the district court abused its discretion by depriving Mr. Scovill of the
ability to present such evidence.

C.

The State Will Be Unable To Prove The Error Is Harmless Beyond A Reasonable Doubt
When a defendant objects to an error and shows that a violation occurred, the State bears

the burden of proving "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute
to the verdict obtained." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 221 (2008) (quoting Chapman v.

California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)); see also Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 296 (1991).
The question "is whether the jury actually rested its verdict on evidence establishing the
presumed fact beyond a reasonable doubt, independently of' the inadmissible evidence. Yates v.

Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 404 (1991). "The inquiry, in other words, is not whether, in a trial that
occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the
guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error." Sullivan v.

Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275,279 (1993) (emphasis added).
The district court's ruling prevented Mr. Scovill from presenting evidence about what
was actually going on in his head at the time he committed the alleged battery. Mr. Scovill
testified that he did not remember much of what happened that night (Tr. 4/25/18, p.267, Ls.1517), that his behavior was abnormal (Tr. 4/25/18, p.267, L.18 - p.268, L.6), that he was trying to
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avoid the officers (Tr. 4/25/18, p.269, Ls.15-19), and most importantly, that he was not trying to
make contact with Mr. Albright, but was rather trying to move around him to leave (Tr. 4/25/18,
p.285, Ls.7-19).

He was not allowed to tell the jury that the reason he can't remember

everything, was behaving abnormally, was trying to avoid the officers, and was trying to move
past Mr. Albright, was because he was suffering from a mental health crisis at the time.
The State was required to prove that Mr. Albright either "willfully" used force of
violence, "intentionally" touched or struck, or "intentionally caused bodily harm to Mr. Albright,
in order for the jury to find him guilty. See J.l. 22; J.I. 24. The State will be unable to prove,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the district court's error in precluding him from presenting
evidence tending to negate, or at least call into question, whether he had the requisite mental
state, did not contribute to the verdict and is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

II.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Failing To Strike Mr. Albright's Testimony That
Mr. Scovill Made Contact With Him Before He Took Mr. Scovill To The Ground, As A
Sanction For The State's Failure To Disclose This Assertion Prior To Trial
A.

Introduction
The district court ultimately recognized that the State violated its obligations under I.C.R.

16(b)(6) to disclose that Mr. Albright intended to testify that Mr. Scovill made contact with him
before he took Mr. Scovill to the ground, as this testimony was diametrically opposed to

Mr. Albright's prior statements and prior testimony, and Mr. Albright informed the State about
his proffered new testimony prior to trial. However, the court did not strike this portion of
Mr. Albright's testimony because it found the video of the incident speaks for itself, despite the
fact that the district court previously struck Ms. Barnes' testimony on the very same subject, for
essentially the same reason. The district court abused its discretion in this decision by failing to
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exercise reason. The video simply does not show whether or not Mr. Scovill made contact with
Mr. Albright prior to Mr. Albright taking him to the ground, and Mr. Albright's testimony fills in
that blank. Thus, the only evidence that a battery occurred at that point in time is Mr. Albright's
testimony - testimony that up until he was actually on the witness stand, the State had failed to
disclose to the defense.

B.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Failing To Strike Mr. Albright's Testimony
That Mr. Scovill Made Contact With Him Prior To Mr. Albright Taking Him To The
Ground
Idaho Criminal Rule 16(b)(6) reads as follows:

State Witnesses. On written request of the defendant, the prosecuting attorney
must furnish to the defendant a written list of the names and addresses of all
persons having knowledge of relevant facts who may be called by the state as
witnesses at the trial, together with any record of prior felony convictions of any
of them, that is within the knowledge of the prosecuting attorney. The
prosecuting attorney must also furnish. on written request, the statements made
by the prosecution witnesses or prospective prosecution witnesses to the
prosecuting allorney or the prosecuting attorney's agents or to any official
involved in the investigation of the case unless a protective order is issued as
provided in subsection (I) of this rule.
I.C.R. 16(b)(6) (emphasis added). Consistently with the mandate of this rule, Mr. Scovill's
attorney filed a formal discovery request, asking the State to provide the defense with "(a]ny
statements made by co-defendants, prosecution witnesses or prospective prosecution witnesses to
the Prosecuting Attorney or his agents or to any official involved in the investigative process of
the case." (R., pp.35-37 (emphasis added).) Mr. Scovill's counsel •'further requested that the
Prosecuting Attorney provide any of the above-requested material on a continuing basis
throughout this case without the necessity of further formal requests" (R., p.3 7.)
During the preliminary hearing, Mr. Albright testified that Mr. Scovill "turned and spun
to confront me; and I believe he raised his left arm like he was going to throw a punch."
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(Tr. Prelim, p.9, L.23 - p.10, L.8.) Mr. Albright continued, "when [Mr. Scovill] raised his ann
and stepped towards me, I wrapped him up around the torso and the head with my arms and my
upper body and took him to the ground." (Tr. Prelim, p.10, Ls.9-12.) He further made it clear
that he attacked Mr. Scovill before Mr. Scovill could attack him: "I don't have to wait to be
punched before I can take use force - or use use of force." (Tr. Prelim, p.19, L.23 - p.20, L. l .)
At trial, Mr. Albright's testimony changed: "I was still moving forward. Mr. Scovill

came and hit me in the chest with his upper torso. I wrapped him up." (Tr. 4/24/18, p.181,
Ls.10-12 (emphasis added).) The district court found that "technically," the State's failure to
disclose Mr. Albright's new version of events to the defense prior to trial, was a discovery
violation. {Tr. 4/24/ 18, p.198, L.11 - p.199, L.11.)

If a court finds that a party violated its obligations to provide discovery, the court has
"considerable discretion under Idaho Criminal Rule l 6(k) to fashion an appropriate remedy if
there is a violation of the disclosure requirement." State v. Montgomery, 163 Idaho 40, 45
(2017). Idaho appellate courts review such decisions for an abuse of discretion. Id. In this case,
the district court failed to exercise reason when it denied Mr. Scovill's motion to strike.
The district court stated its reasoning as follows:
The problem is, is the video speaks for itself. The video trumps
everything. I mean, regardless of what this witness or any other witness says
about how they perceived the incident, the video speaks for itself. And so that - I
think you're probably right, that's a change in testimony; but I don't think it's
material because we do have the video to show exactly what happened regardless
of what this or any other witness says.
Technically I think you're correct, Mr. Thomas. From a substantial substantive standpoint I don't think it makes any difference. It's certainly not
prejudicial enough to where I feel like I need to strike that at this point. Frankly,
it calls more attention to the statement anyway. So I'm not going to disallow it. I
guess if I was doing what I did earlier, a limiting instruction; but I don't that that
is going to cure anything. Even though the testimony's changed a bit, it's still not
going to affect how the jury views the video. That's just how I see that.
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(Tr. 4/24/18, p.198, Ls.2-20.)
The district court failed to exercise reason in two particulars. First, the video simply does
not speak for itself. It does not show whether or not Mr. Albright wrapped up Mr. Scovill's
head, neck, and shoulder area prior to Mr. Scovill making any contact with him, as Mr. Albright
testified during the preliminary hearing (Tr. Prelim, p.19, L.23 - p.20, L. 1), or whether
Mr. Scovill made contact with Mr. Albright's chest area before Mr. Albright wrapped up
Mr. Scovill, as Mr. Albright testified at trial (Tr. 4/24/18, p.181, Ls. I 0-12). (Ex. I: 09: 13-09:20.)
Second, Mr. Albright's testimony about his perception of what occurred is absolutely
relevant to how the jurors would interpret what the video shows. Mr. Albright's trial claim that
Mr. Scovill made contact with him before he took Mr. Scovill to the ground fills in the gap of
what the video simply does not show. In explaining why he was testifying differently at trial
than he had during the preliminary hearing, Mr. Albright told the district court and the jury that
watching the video multiple times made his memory of what occurred clearer. (Tr. 4/24/18,
p.162, L.19 - p.163, L.7; p.205, Ls.6-12.) This is not a circumstance in which a video clearly
shows one person strike another; instead, the video shows Mr. Scovill and Mr. Albright moving
towards each other, and Mr. Albright placing his hands and arms on Mr. Scovill's head and neck
area and taking him to the ground. (Ex. 1: 09: 13-09-20.) Only Mr. Albright and Mr. Scovill
could know whether or not Mr. Scovill made contact with Mr. Albright's chest before
Mr. Albright took him to the ground and punched him repeatedly in the face. Rather than the
video speaking for itself, Mr. Albright spoke for the video.
In short, the district court found that the State violated I.C.R. 16(b)(6) by failing to
disclose Mr. Albright's new claims about what happened during the incident prior to trial, but the
court failed to strike this portion of Mr. Albright's testimony as a sanction for that violation,
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despite doing that very same thing earlier in the trial upon learning that the State violated the
same rule by failing to disclose Mr. Barnes' testimony on the subject. The court reached this
decision based upon the faulty premise that the video speaks for itself, and that Mr. Albright's
testimony about what transpired could not impact how the jury would view the video evidence.
The court failed to exercise reason in this decision and thus abused its discretion by failing to
grant Mr. Scovill's request that the court strike Mr. Albright's testimony in this regard, as a
sanction for the State's violation of !.C.R. 16(b)(6).

C.

The State Will Be Unable To Prove The Error Is Harmless Beyond A Reasonable Doubt
The State will be unable to prove "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained

of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.'' Peny, 150 Idaho at 221. As noted above, the
video simply does not show whether or not Mr. Scovill made contact with Mr. Albright prior to
Mr. Albright taking him to the ground. (Ex. I: 09: 13-09.20.) Mr. Albright's testimony on this
subject was absolutely critical to the State's claim that Mr. Scovill battered Mr. Albright in this
manner, the only theory the State was allowed to ultimately argue to the jury. (Tr. 4/24/18,
p.221, L. 24 - p.222, L.12.) The State will be unable to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
the district court's failure to strike this testimony as a sanction for the State's discovery violation
did not contribute to the verdict and was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

III.
The Accumulation Of Errors. Even If Individually Harmless. Deprived Mr. Scovill Of His
Fourteenth Amendment Right To A Fair Trial
Errors which individually might be harmless can require reversal if the accumulation of
those errors show the defendant was denied a fair trial and, thus, due process. State v. Martinez,
125 ldaho 445, 453 (1994); State v. Paciorek, 137 Idaho 629, 635 (Ct. App. 2002). To find
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cumulative error, this Court must first conclude that there is merit to more than one of the claims
of error, and then conclude that the aggregate of those errors denied the defendant a fair trial.

State v. Love/ass, 133 Idaho 160, 171 (Ct. App. 1999). Mr. Scovill asserts that the district
court's decision precluding him from presenting evidence of his mental condition at the time of
the incident, coupled with the court's refusal to strike Mr. Albright's testimony, even if
individual harmless, deprived him of his right to a fair trial.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Scovill respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction for battery against a
health care worker.
DATED this 30th day of September, 2019.
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